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LET’S STOP PLAYING GAMES: A CONSISTENT
TEST FOR UNLICENSED TRADEMARK USE AND
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN VIDEO GAMES
ARLEN PAPAZIAN*
ABSTRACT
Courts cannot agree on how to handle cases centered on unlicensed use of a trademark or celebrity’s likeness in video games.
Two tests have arisen as the primary standards by which to judge
such cases: the Rogers test and the transformative-use test. However, in an area of law muddled by multiple standards and the
inconsistent application of those standards to a relatively new medium, neither test can adequately balance mark holder rights with
the constitutional rights of video game developers. In this turmoil,
large video game companies take advantage of marks and licenses
knowing the rightful holders will have little recourse, while other
mark holders bring frivolous suits against earnest game developers
who simply want to create a work of immersive art. In order to tame
this unrest, courts must adopt a single standard that can be applied
consistently to all cases. Many scholars tout the transformativeuse test as this standard, but it is not adequate.
This Note proposes a modification of the Rogers test that considers the factors of sufficient transformation, affirmative statements of sponsorship by the developer, the purpose of the mark use,
and its frequency and importance in the context of the video game.
This test will allow courts to comprehensively balance all parties’
rights while still upholding precedential case law.

* Author is a J.D. Candidate at William & Mary Law School. He wishes to
thank his family for always encouraging and supporting him, in particular his
sister, Sabrina Papazian, for being a brilliant and driven role model, as well as
the staff of The William & Mary Business Law Review for all their work in
editing this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
Ryan Hart stands poised, ready for the snap. He dons his jersey,
number thirteen with “RUTGERS” emblazoned proudly above it in
large block letters. This is his home field; these are his fans that
cheer enthusiastically in the crowd. The din diminishes as they
wait for the game announcer to finish the sponsored advertisement. The image on the jumbotron shifts back to the field as the
large Pontiac logo disappears off the screen. His team makes some
last second adjustments to prepare themselves for the play. He
locks his eyes on the football and takes a step back. These are the
moments Ryan Hart plays football for. These are the moments
Ryan Hart lives for. Except, this is not Ryan Hart. It is a virtual
avatar of Ryan Hart. This is not Rutgers’s field; we are in EA
Sports’s video game NCAA Football 2005. And, this is not what
Ryan Hart signed up for.
TV shows and movies frequently use celebrity likenesses as
well as real-world products and brand names in order to create a
more recognizable and immersive experience to which viewers
can relate.1 Video games may be a more recent form of art and
entertainment, but they too often use real-world likenesses to deliver a captivating experience.2 However, video game developers
are not always consistent in whether they gain permission from
celebrities or trademark holders whose likenesses they use.3
See Wesley W. Wintermyer, Who Framed Rogers v. Grimaldi?: What Protects Trademark Holders Against First Amendment Immunity for Video Games?,
64 ALA. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2013).
2 Even some of the earliest video games used celebrity likenesses to help
sales. See Peter Mai, Plagiarism?: Video Game Art That Looks Like the Movies,
OC WEEKLY (June 2, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://blogs.ocweekly.com/heardmental
ity/2010/06/plagiarism_video_game_art_that_copied_movie_posters.php [https://
perma.cc/VPZ6-ZHN8] (describing resemblances between many video game characters and contemporary movie stars through the decades).
3 Compare Chris Suellentrop, Casting the Single-Player Movie Star: Kevin
Spacey Stars in Call of Duty: Advanced Warfare, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/arts/video-games/kevin-spacey-stars-in-call-of-duty
-advanced-warfare.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/L32V-BZZP], with Sam Byford,
Ellen Page Accuses ‘The Last of Us’ Developers of ‘Ripping Off’ Her Likeness,
THE VERGE (June 24, 2013, 1:26 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/24
/4458368/ellen-page-says-the-last-of-us-ripped-off-her-license [https://perma.cc
/QRW4-VR2M].
1
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Sometimes the developer will not bother to ask for permission at
all.4 Other times, developers may hire an actor to undergo motioncapture filming and rendering to deliver as lifelike a performance
as possible.5 The inconsistent practices of developers stem from the
relative novelty of the video game industry and the varying tests that
courts apply to settle cases of unlicensed image use in this field.6
The inconsistent practices of developers do not end with celebrity likenesses. In order to fully assimilate players into the universe created by the video game, different games can include all
manner of consumer products and brand names based on realworld counterparts: cars, clothes, weapons, and more.7 These
products and brands are frequently trademarked, but developers
do not bother seeking approval from the trademark holder to use
their intellectual property.8
Trademark law exists to prevent consumer confusion and protect ownership rights.9 A right of publicity is also widely recognized
by many states,10 often as an extension of the right of privacy.11
The right of publicity exists to protect an individual’s ability to
control the image and reputation that he has built for himself.12
These rights can sometimes come at odds with the First Amendment right of freedom of expression of another party who desires
to use his image.13 Freedom of expression protects the use of a
Byford, supra note 3.
Suellentrop, supra note 3.
6 Compare E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095,
1099 (9th Cir. 2008) (utilizing a standard called the Rogers test), with Hart v.
Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 160 (3d Cir. 2013), and In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig, 724 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013)
(applying the transformative-use test).
7 Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1243.
8 Id. at 1243–44.
9 James E. Stewart & Amy A. Lehman, The First Amendment and the Lanham
Act: What is This Thing Called Artistic Relevance?, 28 COMM. LAW. 4, 4 (2012);
see also Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012).
10 See generally Right of Publicity: An Overview, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Publicity [http://perma.cc/9LF8-U6J8].
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652I (recognizing intrusion, false light, appropriation of name or likeness, and unreasonable publicity
as the four types of invasion of privacy).
12 Joseph Gutmann, Note, It’s in the Game: Redefining the Transformative
Use Test for the Video Game Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 217 (2012).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4
5

2017]

LET’S STOP PLAYING GAMES

581

name, likeness, or trademark except when used in a commercial
manner.14 Courts should establish a consistent test with which to
best balance these competing rights.
Part of the trouble with determining consistent outcomes for
cases revolving around video games arises from the gray area that
they occupy as both an artistic work and a commercial product. Use
of a likeness, name, or trademark without license for purely artistic
expression is protected.15 On the other hand, the Lanham Act prohibits unlicensed use of that same likeness, name, or trademark
for a primarily commercial purpose.16 Video games are undoubtedly both, so how should courts decide how to categorize decisions?
Different courts have primarily used two different tests to
judge cases of this kind: the Rogers test and the transformativeuse test.17 Cases involving the right to publicity tend to invoke
the transformative-use test,18 while cases involving claims of
trademark usually stand scrutiny against the Rogers test.19 This
Note discusses which test would be most effective in determining
both categories of claims. Part I lays out the background cases from
which the primary tests were derived.20 Part II examines the treatment of right of publicity issues in video game cases.21 Part III
delves into some of the counterpart cases centered on trademark
use in video games.22 Part IV argues that video games are primarily a consumer product and that the Lanham Act should govern
both right of publicity cases and trademark cases, and both should
be subject to the same test.23 Finally, Part V proposes use of a
Id.; see also Gutmann, supra note 12, at 218.
“[B]ecause of First Amendment concerns, the Lanham Act cannot apply...
‘within the realm of artistic expression[.]’” Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994,
997 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1988)). See generally Steward & Lehman, supra note 9.
16 Right of Publicity: An Overview, supra note 10; see also Trademark (Lanham)
Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012).
17 See generally Rogers, 875 F.2d 994 (establishing Rogers test); see also
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001)
(establishing the transformative-use test); Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1244.
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part III.
20 See infra Part I.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part IV.
14
15
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modified Rogers test that incorporates the transformative-use
test as a factor.24 This test considers other factors as well—namely
presence of an affirmative statement of sponsorship, purpose of
the mark use, and frequency and importance of the use—to ensure
even-handed protection of mark holders as well as the artistic expression of video game developers.
I. BACKGROUND
A “likelihood of confusion” analysis stands as the traditional
test used in trademark infringement cases.25 While courts may
consider varying factors in this analysis, the core determinations
are outlined in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.26 These
variables include: the strength of the prior owner’s mark, the degree of similarity between the marks, the commercial proximity
of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the
gap by entering and competing in the subsequent owner’s market,
the risk of actual consumer confusion, the intent of the defendant
to capitalize on the reputation of the prior owner, the quality of
the defendant’s product, and the sophistication of consumers.27
This long list of factors has been a source of confusion in many
trademark cases,28 but it is particularly ill-suited regarding cases
involving video game disputes.
Video games did not find widespread mainstream popularity
and commercial success until the 1970s,29 about a decade after
Polaroid was decided. Polaroid could not have contemplated virtual trademark use, as it was not a technological possibility at the
time. Furthermore, trademarks used in video games are usually
merely incidental in the context of the game.30 Ideally, only in rare
See infra Part V.
See Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1244.
26 See generally Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year
Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 3 (2010).
27 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
28 Blum et al., supra note 26, at 3.
29 Riad Chikhani, The History of Gaming: An Evolving Community,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 31, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/31/the-history-of
-gaming-an-evolving-community/ [http://perma.cc/U3NB-SU7Q].
30 “[U]se of the mark is only incidental to the game itself and not integral to
its sale or marketing, the likelihood is slim that the average gamer would be
24
25
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cases should a consumer face actual confusion about a mark holder’s
role in developing a game.31 On the other hand, the increase of
product placement in video games, and all media generally, may
lead consumers to believe that the appearance of a familiar trademark or likeness is the result of cross-promotion.32
Instead of trying to stretch the “likelihood of confusion” test
developed by the Polaroid court for trademark disputes in pure
commercial settings, courts have sought to resolve trademark disputes in video games by applying tests used in comparable cases
involving similar media—namely television and movies.33 In Rogers
v. Grimaldi, Ginger Rogers—a famous actress—brought action
against defendant filmmakers for invoking her name and reputation in the movie “Ginger and Fred.”34 Rogers brought claims under the common law right to publicity and under the Lanham
Act.35 Rogers carefully selected her chosen endorsements and
feared her reference by the film would cause consumers to believe
she endorsed the work.36 That court found in favor of the filmmakers, holding that the use of a mark or celebrity’s name in the title
of a work is permitted so long as the title has some artistic relevance to the underlying work and is not meant to explicitly mislead as to the source or content of the work.37 This test presumes
that every use of a mark is protected by the First Amendment
freedom of artistic expression.38 Because of the low standard for
confused that the markholder actually developed the game.” Wintermyer, supra
note 1, at 1244 (citing Russell Frackman & Joel Leviton, Trademarks, Video
Games and the First Amendment: An Evolving Story, WORLD TRADEMARK REV.,
Oct./Nov. 2010, at 62, 63).
31 Id.
32 See infra notes 113–21.
33 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1961).
34 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).
35 Id. The Lanham Act protects against
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, ... uses in commerce any ... name ... which ... is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ....
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
36 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
37 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
38 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1257.
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artistic relevance, the Rogers test is extremely lenient towards
the user of a mark or name.39
The transformative-use test has emerged as another standard
by which courts analyze use of a name, mark, or image in artistic
media. This test, instead of determining the value of artistic relevance, focuses on whether the use varies from the protected mark
in a substantial creative way.40 The California Supreme Court pioneered the transformative-use test in Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.41 In that case, Comedy III Productions
owned the rights to the former comedy act The Three Stooges.42
Comedy III Productions sued Saderup, an artist selling lithographs and t-shirts bearing the likenesses of the Three Stooges,
Moe, Larry, and Curly, for infringement of its right of publicity.43
That court asked if the contested work added significant creative
elements so as to transform it into something more than a mere
imitation or celebrity likeness.44 The First Amendment protects
works that have been sufficiently transformed in this way, but
does not protect depictions that are mere replications.45 The
court, in its holding, recognized the right of publicity as an intellectual property right.46 Recently, in 2013, both the Third and
Ninth Circuits accepted the transformative-use test as the appropriate standard in right of publicity cases regarding reproduction
of celebrity likenesses.47
The transformative-use test does not provide as much leniency
to unlicensed trademark users as the Rogers test does. While Rogers
The Rogers test is designed to protect consumers from flagrant deception,
not intellectual property right holders. Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1252. The
Rogers court defined the standard for artistic relevance that the mark or name
must meet as the extremely low threshold of “minimal” artistic relevance. Id.
at 1257.
40 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 800.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 799, 809 (stating that the First Amendment will not protect the
depiction if it is “the very sum and substance of the work in question.”).
45 See Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1257.
46 Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 806.
47 See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th
Cir. 2013).
39
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provides the defendant the wide berth of a low threshold for artistic relevance, the transformative-use test places the burden of
proof on the content producer to prove that the trademark use
presents enough creative difference to warrant protection under
the First Amendment.48 However, the transformative-use test
has led to varying results by different courts because of the vagueness of what constitutes “significant creative elements.”49
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE-USE
TEST IN VIDEO GAMES
The first case to apply the transformative-use test to a video game
was another California case, Kirby v. Sega of America.50 Kierin
Kirby, lead singer for Deee-Lite, a funk-dance band in the early
1990s, brought suit against Sega of America for allegedly using
her likeness as the basis for the protagonist character in the game
Space Channel 5.51 Kirby claimed the character resembled her facial features, futuristic clothing style, hairstyle, use of catch phrases,
and musical and dance abilities.52 Applying the transformativeuse test, that court determined that Sega had transformed the
virtual character into more than a mere likeness or exact depiction of Kirby.53 This was primarily because the character wore
different costumes and used different dance moves than Kirby;
additionally, the character was a futuristic news reporter by profession, dissimilar to Kirby’s public image as a music diva.54
More recently, many cases centering on virtual representations of college athletes, primarily football players, in sports video
Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1258.
District courts in California and New Jersey have applied the transformativeuse test to very similar fact patterns and came to different results based on
their interpretations of the definition of “sum and substance.” Gutmann, supra
note 12, at 225.
50 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
51 Id. at 50–52.
52 Id. at 56. For a comparison image of Ms. Kirby and Space Channel 5 protagonist, “Ulala,” see The Right of Publicity—Concerns About the Reach of Keller
v. EA, WRITER IN L. (Aug. 16, 2013, 6:31 PM), https://writerinlaw.files.word
press.com/2013/08/kirby.jpg [https://perma.cc/M9WB-E6H9].
53 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59.
54 Id. “Taken together, these differences demonstrate Ulala is ‘transformative,’ and respondents added creative elements to create a new expression.” Id.
48
49
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games have addressed the right of publicity and the transformativeuse test.55 These cases applied the same test to very similar facts,
but—because of the vagueness of the transformative-use test—came
to different conclusions at the district court level.56 The District
Court for the Northern District of California held in Keller v. Electronic Arts that a virtual representation of college football player
Sam Keller in the video game series NCAA Football did not constitute a transformative use and was therefore barred from First
Amendment protection.57 That court looked at the built-in characteristics of the avatar to determine if any significant elements
had been added. It did not consider the ability for players to customize and interact with the avatars.58
A District of New Jersey court looked at different factors in
determining what might suffice as creative elements for transformative use, originally holding in Hart v. Electronic Arts that
the avatar of Ryan Hart in the same NCAA Football video game
franchise on its own would constitute an untransformed image;
however, a player’s ability to customize the features of the avatar
made for a transformative use.59 When deciding what establishes
the significant creative elements for transformative-use, that
court not only considered the physical depiction of the avatar and
the game’s environment, but also the level of changeability and
interactivity available to game players.60
Despite confusion at the district court level, circuit courts have
been more consistent with their rulings on transformative-use
See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th
Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d
955 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
56 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 225.
57 Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at *5.
58 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 217. The Court only looked at similarity of
physical characteristics between Keller and his avatar: height, weight, jersey
number, and public image as a football player. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at *5.
59 The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey stated that since
interactivity is an essential nature of video games, the ability for consumers to
edit the features of the virtual players and the “potential formulations of each
virtual player alone makes the game a transformative use of Hart’s image.”
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 785 (D.N.J. 2011), rev’d, 717 F.3d
141 (3d Cir. 2013).
60 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 224–25.
55
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cases in video games.61 In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation v. Electronic Arts (“In re NCAA”),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision that the use of Keller’s image in the NCAA Football series
did not constitute a transformative use.62 The Third Circuit, on
the other hand, reversed the district court of New Jersey’s decision
in Hart.63 The Third Circuit still applied the transformative-use
test, but it did not find that the ability to customize and modify the
avatars to satisfied the significant creative element requirement.64
Since the original unmodified avatar was an untransformed use,
the First Amendment did not protect it.65 These decisions begin to
harmonize the standard and interpretation of the transformativeuse test. The earlier district court decisions demonstrate, however,
that there still exists variation in how the test may be applied.
When looking at the difference between the outcomes of the Kirby
case and the NCAA Football cases, it appears that the environment and persona of the virtual depictions stand as critical issues
in determining whether a significant transformation occurred.66
III. USE OF UNLICENSED TRADEMARKS AND THE ROGERS
TEST IN VIDEO GAMES
Courts have readily applied the Rogers test to many cases involving unlicensed use of a trademark in video games.67 Although
See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268
(9th Cir. 2013).
62 NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1276.
This case is a continuation of Keller as a larger class-action suit. See id.
63 Hart, 717 F.3d at 141.
64 Id. at 166, 174–75.
65 Id. at 170.
66 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 225. An important factor in deciding if there
has been a transformative use should be whether or not the game takes place
in an “altered reality” or is an “imitation of life.” Id. at 227. An environment
that solely seeks to imitate life through realism is not an original creation. Id. at
229. However, when a developer places a celebrity’s likeness in a new environment or gives it a new persona or new characteristics, the game alters significant aspects of reality and gives rise to a new creation that should be protected
by the First Amendment. Id. at 228–29.
67 See generally E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 v. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095 (9th
Cir. 2008); VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t America LLC, No. 3:15-cv01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015); Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc.
61
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the Rogers test traditionally applies to the title of an artistic work,
it may also be extended to a trademark use in the body of the
work—in these cases, trademark use within actual video games.68
In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000 v. Rock Star Videos, the owner of a
strip club, Play Pen Gentlemen’s Club, brought suit against Rockstar, the developer of the Grand Theft Auto video game series.69
The game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas takes place in a fictional
recreation of California State and even contains a cartoon-style replication of Los Angeles entitled “Los Santos.”70 In order to appropriately capture the feeling of the seedy underbelly of Los Angeles,
Los Santos contained a virtual strip club called the “Pig Pen.”71
The owner of the real-life strip club, the Play Pen, claimed that
the virtual gentleman’s club constituted trademark infringement
on the business from which it drew its inspiration.72 The Ninth Circuit applied the Rogers test to determine that the “Pig Pen” served
at least “some artistic relevance” in setting the tone of the game,73
and Rockstar did not attempt to “explicitly mislead … as to the
source or content of the work.”74 This holding shows the exceptional leniency of the “artistic relevance” prong of the test.75 The
video game is not about a strip club, nor is the strip club necessary
to the story; it simply exists as a set piece to establish the “look
and feel” of the environment.76 Under this standard, it is hard to
imagine an example that would not satisfy the relevance prong of
the Rogers test.

v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Novalogic,
Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 885 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Dillinger,
LLC v. Elec. Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678 (S.D. Ind.
June 16, 2011).
68 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1099.
69 Id. at 1097–98.
70 GRAND THEFT AUTO: SAN ANDREAS (Rockstar Games, PlayStation 2 2004);
E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1097.
71 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1097.
72 Id. at 1097–98.
73 Id. at 1100 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)).
74 Id. A reasonable buyer would not conclude that a small, largely unknown
strip club helped produce a technically complicated game that painted the club
in an unfavorable light; nor would a buyer reasonably believe that a game developer operated a strip club. Id. at 1100–01.
75 Id. at 1099.
76 Id. at 1100.
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Since E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, courts in the Ninth Circuit
have repeatedly and liberally applied the Rogers test to video game
cases.77 One district court in the Seventh Circuit also has applied
the same standard.78 That case centered on the use of the “Dillinger”
trademark name—referencing famous American gangster John
Dillinger—in naming weapons in Electronic Arts’s The Godfather
games.79 The plaintiff argued that the use of Dillinger’s name was not
a reasonably necessary aspect of the games because John Dillinger
did not appear in the video games nor the films or novel on which
Electronic Arts based the games.80 The court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument because Dillinger’s name, even though only superficial
and attenuated, had at least some artistic relevance in establishing the Mafia world of The Godfather games.81
Since the “artistic relevance” prong of the Rogers test sweepingly permits trademark use in the name of the First Amendment,
it is hoped that the second prong—the “explicitly misleading”
prong—might help to balance trademark holders’ interests against
developers’ constitutional rights. In a suit against Textron Innovations, Electronic Arts—once again the perpetrator of unlicensed
trademark use—preemptively brought action to justify use of a virtual representation of a Bell Helicopter in the video game Battlefield 3 under the Rogers test.82 The district court denied Electronic
See generally VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t America LLC, No.
3:15-cv-01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint of infringement for use of VIRAG’s trademark in defendant’s
games Gran Turismo 5 and Gran Turismo 6); Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting summary
judgment to defendants for use of registered “angry monkey” mark on military
combat gear in Call of Duty: Ghosts); Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,
41 F. Supp. 3d 885 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (granting summary judgment to defendants
regarding use of word mark “Delta Force” in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3).
78 See generally Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMSDKL, 2011 WL 2457678 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011).
79 Electronic Arts chose to name two Tommy Guns after Dillinger because
he was popularly depicted wielding the submachine guns as his weapon of choice.
Id. at *2.
80 Id. at *4. Plaintiff further argued that John Dillinger was not even alive
during the time period in which the games take place and operated in a different location from the games’ setting. Id.
81 Id. at *5.
82 See generally Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Textron Inc., No. C 12-00118 WHA,
2012 WL 3042668 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).
77
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Arts’s motion to dismiss Textron’s counterclaims.83 Textron’s allegations raised sufficient support for an inference that Battlefield
3 and its advertising were explicitly misleading as to its source
and content.84 Textron claimed that the ability to virtually fly Bell
Helicopters in the game would factor into a consumer’s decision to
buy Battlefield 3.85 The video game’s website additionally advertised one of the helicopters specifically in a promotional image encouraging consumers to buy the game.86 Despite Textron’s strong
argument to trigger the explicitly misleading prong of the Rogers
test, Electronic Arts settled the suit out of court before a final verdict
could be entered. Although details of the settlement are unknown,
perhaps Electronic Arts was eager to settle in order to prevent the
risk of that court holding that the use of Textron’s trademark and
trade dress triggered the explicitly misleading prong. A ruling
against Electronic Arts would have created troublesome precedent
for them that could have checked the developer’s so-far-unbridled
use of unlicensed trademarks and likenesses.
The Rogers requirement that unlicensed mark users avoid explicitly misleading consumers may provide more hope for trademark
holders than the requirement for artistic relevance. Unfortunately, it is still rather lenient towards the game developers. This
second prong of the test is still difficult for complainants to fulfill
because, to be explicitly misleading, the unlicensed use must be more
than merely a representation of the plaintiff’s mark; instead, the defendant’s work must make some sort of affirmative statement of
the other party’s endorsement accompanying that representation.87
In spite of their legal difficulties surrounding Battlefield 3,
Electronic Arts decided not to sign licensing agreements with
arms manufacturers for trademarked weapons in the sequel
game in the series, Battlefield 4.88 This could potentially cause the
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3. Textron argued that “[c]onsumers of these games expect that
the intellectual property of a party is used with the permission and approval
of the mark’s owner, particularly when a purpose of the game is to realistically
simulate the use of a product associated with the mark.” Id. at *4.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL
2457678, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011).
88 “[T]hey’re asserting their constitutional free speech right to use trademarks without permission.” Tom Sykes, EA ditches gun licensing deals this
83
84
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developer to run into issues with the explicitly misleading prong
of Rogers. Electronic Arts had previously paid the arms makers for
the rights to virtually reproduce real-world weapons,89 which consumers could view as a mutual endorsement of the products.
Furthermore, only a few months earlier, Electronic Arts was
criticized for promoting gun manufacturers.90 As part of marketing for the game Medal of Honor: Warfighter, the developer created a website detailing all of the game’s featured weapons.91 Not
only did the website list all of the arms, but it also contained direct
hyperlinks to the manufacturers’ purchasing catalogs for each of the
respective weapons.92 The game developer publicly boasted on its
official website about its partnerships with some of these manufacturers.93 Even if Electronic Arts were to argue that consumers
would not normally assume a brand placement in a video game
indicates the mark holder’s permission and approval, given Electronic Art’s recent open sponsorship and licensing agreements for
trademarked weapons in its previous war video games, a reasonable consumer might conclude that Electronic Arts has made the
same marketing links for weaponry in Battlefield 4. The earlier open
sponsorship between the weapons manufacturers and Electronic
Arts may be enough to constitute an affirmative statement of endorsement that could be extrapolated to the subsequent game. If
a challenge arises as to their now-unlicensed virtual representations of those weapons, Electronic Arts may find it difficult to
year—but will continue to use branded guns, PC GAMER (May 7, 2013), http://
www.pcgamer.com/ea-ditches-gun-licensing-deals-this-year-but-will-continue
-to-use-branded-guns/ [https://perma.cc/9G34-V7V6].
89 Luke Plunkett, EA Won’t Be Paying For Real Guns in Video Games Anymore,
KOTAKU (May 7, 2013, 11:08 PM), http://kotaku.com/ea-wont-be-paying-for-real
guns-in-video-games-anymore-494940003 [https://perma.cc/96G2-2XUB].
90 Paul Tassi, Cross Promotion Gone Wrong: EA Removes Gun Manufacturer
Links from Warfighter Site, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/12/27/cross-promotion-gone-wrong-ea-removes
-gun-manufacturer-links-from-warfighter-site/ [https://perma.cc/G38C-3PWA].
91 Barry Meier & Andrew Martin, Real and Virtual Firearms Nurture a
Marketing Link, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/25
/business/real-and-virtual-firearms-nurture-marketing-link.html?_r=2&adxnnl
=1&adxnnlx=1356617383-HtbSZYGgjvJzKPLLDYDh5A [https://perma.cc/82KQ
-MVUY].
92 Id.
93 Tassi, supra note 90.
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overcome the Rogers requirement that the work must not be explicitly misleading as to source or content.
IV. A CASE FOR A UNIFIED TEST: VIDEO GAMES PRIMARILY
SERVE A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE
Use of both the transformative-use test and the Rogers test to
decide cases involving the right of publicity and unlicensed trademark use in video games has led to varying and inconsistent holdings among courts.94 Circuit courts employ the different tests, which
creates confusion about what the applicable standard should be.95
A good example of this uncertainty manifests itself in Brown v.
Electronic Arts, a case not dissimilar to Keller or Hart.96 There, a
professional football player sued Electronic Arts for the use of his
likeness in the Madden NFL series of video games.97 Unlike in the
NCAA video game cases, the court did not apply the transformativeuse test, instead subjecting the claim to the Rogers test.98 The Ninth
Circuit claimed that the Rogers test was appropriate because
Brown brought his claims under the Lanham Act.99 Unsurprisingly,
the court found in favor of the defendant under the exceptionally
permissive Rogers test, where Brown may have prevailed under
the transformative-use test applied in Keller and Hart, which involved developers’ use of personal likenesses.
See supra Parts II–III; see, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235
(9th Cir. 2013).
95 See supra Parts II–III.
96 See generally Brown, 724 F.3d 1235.
97 Id. at 1239.
98 Id. at 1239–41.
99 Id. at 1239.
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person ….
Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
94
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In addition to the unreliable employment of tests among
courts, even courts using the same test can fluctuate in their application of the tests to similar fact patterns.100 Much of the uncertainty could be resolved if both the right of publicity cases and
trademark infringement cases were treated consistently under
the same test.
Although statutory law and state common law generally govern the right of publicity, the Lanham Act can provide protection
of a person’s identity falsely used to advertise a commercial product.101 Some criticize the Ninth Circuit’s use of the Rogers test in
Brown in what could have been a right of publicity case subject to
transformative-use,102 but the Brown court actually made a large
step toward creating a unifying test for right of publicity and
trademark infringement cases in video games. Video games should
be treated as a commercial product, and developers’ use of a celebrity’s likeness should be treated as a commercial purpose. That
way, both types of cases can be afforded federal protection under
the Lanham Act. This would override the diverse and differing
statutory and common law doctrines that currently confuse matters for right of publicity cases in video games.103 Lanham Act
protection would allow for the application of a single test to right
of publicity and trademark infringement cases in video games.
The problem with simply classifying video games as commercial products, of course, is that they do not solely serve a commercial purpose.104 Video games are also artistic expressions subject
to First Amendment protection.105 Video game studios color their
See supra Part II.
See Right of Publicity: An Overview, supra note 10; Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
102 Jonathan Faber, Two New Video Game Rulings from the Ninth Circuit,
Jim Brown v. EA and Keller v. EA, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (Aug. 9, 2013), http://
rightofpublicity.com/tag/lanham-act [https://perma.cc/3C2M-XS5Z].
103 See supra Parts II–III; see, e.g., Brown, 724 F.3d at 1235.
104 Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91 (2011) (“Like
the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary
devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual
world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”).
105 Id.
100
101
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games using various artistic styles to bring their virtual worlds to
life; they can include immersive musical scores, tell stories, create
characters, and convey ideas. A video game is a work of art just
as is a book, a movie, or a play.106
On the other hand, the video game industry is incredibly profitable. Since 2010, video game sales in the United States alone
have brought in an average of just under $16 billion a year.107
Including the hardware and accessories for the games, consumers
in the United States spent $22.41 billion in 2014 alone.108 Video
games draw a wide demographic, including a significant amount
of consumers from every age group.109 While traditionally people
may view video games as for young males, this is simply not the
case.110 The average video game player is 35 years old, and 44 percent of consumers are women.111 Today, four out of every five
American households own a device on which to play video games.112
It is clear from these statistics that video games are a very profitable commercial enterprise.
The fact that companies often contract with video game developers to include product placement only further strengthens the
case to consider video games as a commercial product.113 In modern times, consumers have come to expect product placement in
Id.
See ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASSOC., 2015 SALES, DEMOGRAPHIC AND USAGE
DATA: ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY, at 12
(2015), http://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ESA-Essential-Facts
-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR73-8MHU] (between 2010 and 2014, video game
sales in the United States reached $17.1, $16.7, $15.2, $15.4, $15.4 billion each
year, respectively).
108 Id. at 13.
109 Twenty-six percent of videogame players are under 18 years of age; 30
percent are 18–35; 17 percent are 36–49; and 27 percent are 50 years or older.
Id. at 3.
110 Henry Jenkins, Reality Bytes: Eight Myths About Video Games Debunked,
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kcts/videogamerevolution/impact/myths.html [https://
perma.cc/96VZ-2P6E].
111 ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASSOC., supra note 107, at 3.
112 Id. at 2. This statistic is likely a conservative understatement considering the recent rapid technological advancement and boom of smart phones and
mobile gaming in recent years.
113 Brand placement in video games is particularly effective because it provides for active involvement with the brand as well as a platform for longer
shelf life than other media. See generally Michelle R. Nelson, Recall of Brand
106
107
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much of their visual media.114 Consumers have become so bombarded with it in movies and television that when the camera
zooms in and lingers on the front logo of a Mercedes G-Class SUV
in Jurassic World, consumers know exactly what is going on.115
The same is becoming true for video games.116 The cost of creating
games has risen substantially over the last few years, driven by
increased consumer expectations and the added complexity of each
new generation of video game console technology.117 Despite the
growing cost of production, the consumer price for games has stayed
relatively constant for about a decade.118 To keep up with the cost
of creation, game studios are now looking to other streams of revenue to avoid raising the price for consumers, particularly looking
to product placement.119 As the amount of product placement in
video games increases, consumers expect it more.120 As gamers
become accustomed to seeing product placement, they may begin
Placements in Computer/Video Games, 42 J. OF ADVER. RES., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at
80. This makes it very enticing for companies to contract for product placement
in games.
114 Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use
in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1032 (2009).
115 Drew Harwell, ‘Jurassic World’ Shows Just How Weird Product Placement has Become, WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/12/jurassic-world-shows-just-how-weird-product-place
ment-has-become/?utm_term=.89be4dc47d9f [https://perma.cc/Q2UB-FUGA]. One
study showed that consumers have come to expect product placement so much
that 43 percent of consumers believed that the main purpose of a scene in a
television show featuring a product was to influence purchase, even if no deal
had been made between the mark owner and the television producers. James
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 919 (2007).
116 Nelson, supra note 113, at 81.
117 LILIA GUTNIK, ET AL., NEW TRENDS IN PRODUCT PLACEMENT 12, 16 (2007),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=
0ahUKEwjilLKumuTRAhVDRyYKHf8FAqUQFggdMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
people.ischool.berkeley.edu%2F~hal%2FCourses%2FStratTech09%2FTech%2F
Preso%2FD-placement.doc&usg=AFQjCNH37tjN__h5mq14-X9Jjqzin-GwmA&
sig2=JItk1M57x_QRaUdI_MO-uw&cad=rja [https://perma.cc/7FXJ-8EE7]. Some
blockbuster video games can cost over sixty million dollars and take years to
produce. Id. at 16.
118 Consumers typically pay fifty to sixty dollars for a video game produced
for a home console. Id.
119 Len Glickman & Anita Kim, Product Placement and Technology, 30 ENT.
& SPORTS LAW., Spring 2012, at 32.
120 Rosenblatt, supra note 114, at 1056–57.
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to believe any use of a familiar trademark or celebrity image is
the result of a marketing deal.121
The perception of video games as a commercial product and a
platform for product placement should place them under the protection of the Lanham Act in right of publicity cases. Of course, courts
could extend this same argument to other media, particularly television or movies, but this Note does not delve into the precise character of those media and the body of case law relating to them. Since
video games exist in a twilight area between an artistic work and
a commercial product, it is important that whichever test is applied
balances the rights of artistic expression with the prevention of commercial exploitation: something that neither the transformativeuse test nor the Rogers test in its current form has been able to do.
V. A REFORMED ROGERS TEST: TRANSFORMATIVE-USE AS A
FACTOR FOR THE EXPLICITLY MISLEADING PRONG
The right of publicity in these cases serves to protect the same
interests as trademark law through the Lanham Act.122 In a way,
a celebrity’s name and likeness is his or her own personal trademark.123 Similarly, both categories must also balance those rights
with the First Amendment right of others who seek to use the
marks and likenesses.124 Since both laws contend to protect and
balance the same rights, it should follow that both laws be subject
to the same test in claims of unauthorized use.
Although many criticize the Ninth Circuit’s use of the Rogers
test in Brown,125 that decision is important in establishing that
Id. If consumers believe that a particular kind of trademark use must
always be authorized by the mark holder, then consumers will infer that any
such use implies sponsorship or approval by the mark holder and an unauthorized use becomes, by definition, an infringement. Id. at 1020.
122 Both the right of publicity and trademark law exist to protect against
consumer confusion but also to protect the right holder’s cultivated reputation
and goodwill from others who seek to impermissibly take advantage of it or
tarnished it. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
123 “In cases involving confusion over endorsement by a celebrity plaintiff,
‘mark’ means the celebrity’s persona.” White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971
F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (arising in a case involving a television advertisement promoting a Samsung video-cassette recorder and the unconsented
use of game show host Vanna White’s likeness).
124 See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
125 Faber, supra note 102.
121
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the Rogers test can be used in cases involving celebrity likenesses
in video games. It presents an example of how cases centered on
rights of publicity in video games could be offered federal protection under the Lanham Act.126 If courts accept that the primary
purpose of video games is a commercial one, then they can conclude
that any recreation of a celebrity likeness or name is therefore
commercial in nature.127 Consumers could perceive the appearance of the likeness as a celebrity’s endorsement of the game.128
This would do away with the dual treatment and ensuing confusion between unlicensed trademark use cases and right of publicity cases to create a single test under which both types of cases
could be resolved.
Unfortunately, the great deference that the Rogers test, in its
current form, gives to video game developers does not do much to
protect those whose trademarks and likenesses are used without
permission.129 If the primary purpose of trademark law is to protect against consumer confusion,130 then the Rogers test does not
sufficiently reach that aim given popular beliefs about product
placement.131 An easy way to remedy this without completely
overturning all prior decisions would be to continue using the
Rogers test but to fortify its explicitly misleading prong.
It is actually quite strange that the majority of the right of publicity cases
discussed above do not invoke the Lanham Act and the Rogers test considering
that Rogers v. Grimaldi itself centered around exactly that type of claim. See
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).
127 In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the Ninth Circuit explains how a celebrity’s
likeness used in advertisement may constitute a false endorsement of the advertised product:
A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use of a
celebrity’s identity is a type of false association claim, for it alleges the misuse of a trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such
as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or other uniquely distinguishing characteristic, which is likely to confuse consumers as
to the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of the product.
978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (arising from a case involving a recreated
imitation of famous American singer-song writer Tom Waits’s voice in an advertising campaign).
128 Id.
129 See supra Part III.
130 Stewart & Lehman, supra note 9, at 4.
131 See supra notes 109–16.
126
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The artistic relevance prong of Rogers is lenient, but rightly so.
“Non-zero”132 relevance is extremely permissive, but the standard
allows courts to make a very simple threshold determination about
whether a mark adds any artistic value to the work. Any further
assessment of artistic relevance is far too subjective, so increasing
the standard to anything more than “non-zero” would present a
significant problem in practical applications. Courts likely would
have differing opinions on where to draw the line regarding what
actually makes something artistically valuable and how to distinguish what meets that elevated threshold. A simple non-zero standard, in practice, allows for more consistency in applying the Rogers
test. It keeps what would otherwise become a very gray, opinionbased decision, a binary, black-and-white determination: either a
use has any amount of artistic relevance, or it has none at all.
The explicitly misleading prong, in contrast to the artistic relevance prong, provides room to guard against flagrant unlicensed
mark and likeness use while still protecting the First Amendment
artistic expression rights of video game developers.133 To practically do this, courts must adopt several more factors in determining
whether the use actually misleads as to the source of its content.
Until now, courts have also applied this prong, like artistic relevance, very leniently.134 Absent an affirmative statement or action
from the game developer, a court will not find an unlicensed use
of a mark or likeness to be explicitly misleading.135 It seems this
132 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d. 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[U]nless [it] ... has
no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever ....”) (emphasis added).
133 See supra notes 82–92 and accompanying text. Some of the cases against
Electronic Art’s Battlefield series begin to show how the explicitly misleading
prong may be used to protect mark holder rights. While Textron was settled
out of court before a final verdict, that court was at least sympathetic that the use
of the Bell Helicopter in that game is “sufficient to establish plausible disputes
as to the existence of actual consumer confusion.” Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Textron
Inc., No. C 12-00118 WHA, 2012 WL 3042668, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).
134 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
135 “To be ‘explicitly misleading,’ the defendant’s work must make some affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement, beyond the
mere use of plaintiff’s name or other characteristic.” Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic
Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 16,
2011). For example, the use of “the phrase in a subtitle of ‘an authorized biography’ would be sufficiently explicit to be actionable, if false”; but, evidence
that the trademark use “might implicitly suggest that the named celebrity had
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standard is primarily focused on whether an unlicensed mark user
intends to explicitly mislead consumers. Perhaps this was an adequate standard for use of a mark when Rogers was first decided.
Today, however, given the shift in contemporary expectations for
product placement and endorsement in modern media discussed in
Part IV,136 the presence or absence of an affirmative statement
alone does not do enough to protect against video game developers
explicitly misleading consumers. The standard should not be based
on an unlicensed user’s intent to mislead consumers, but the standard should aim to determine whether the user actually misled them.
Courts could use several factors in making this determination.
While the factors of the original “likelihood of confusion” 137 test
developed in Polaroid do not fit nicely in the context of video
games, they can be looked to for inspiration. A primary consideration under the Polaroid test is the risk of actual consumer confusion.138 As stated above, whether the use of an unlicensed mark
or likeness actually misleads consumers should be the primary
goal of the revised standard. The old Polaroid test also took into
account the sophistication of consumers.139 In the modern approach, this consideration can acknowledge video gamers’ expectations of product placement and celebrity endorsement.
One of the new factors for the explicitly misleading prong
could be transformative use.140 A sufficiently transformed mark
endorsed the work or had a role in producing it” is “outweighed by the danger
of restricting artistic expression.” Id. (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999–1000).
136 See supra Part IV.
137 These factors include: (1) the strength of the prior owner’s mark; (2) the
degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the commercial proximity of the
products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap by entering
and competing in the subsequent owner’s market; (5) the risk of actual consumer confusion; (6) the intent of the defendant to capitalize on the reputation
of the prior owner; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product, and the sophistication of consumers. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495
(2d Cir. 1961). All of these factors do not perfectly align with the concerns for
video game cases, but some of them are still relevant. See id.
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 Transformative use closely resembles “the degree of similarity between
marks” factor from the likelihood of confusion test. Id. Transformative use has
been used to address video game cases already and carries behind it the weight
of the case law discussed in Part II.
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or likeness is unlikely to trigger a consumer’s expectation of product placement or endorsement.141 A transformed mark actually
satisfies both prongs of the Rogers test. In including a transformed mark, the game developer intends it to serve as a contextual tool to either establish an authentic and immersive virtual
reality or as a parody of the unaltered mark.142 Either way, the test’s
artistic relevance standard is very likely met. The transformed
image should be enough to alert consumers that the true mark
holder did not seek to endorse the video game or cross-promote
through it, thus satisfying the Rogers explicitly misleading prong.143
It follows that any finding of a sufficient transformation would
then be dispositive in showing that the same use passes the Rogers
test. The absence of a sufficient transformation, however, would
not necessarily invalidate an unlicensed use if the game developer
could show that it did not explicitly mislead consumers based on
other factors.
Courts should also consider whether the developer made an
affirmative statement of sponsorship as a factor in determining if
a use satisfies the explicitly misleading prong.144 Under the new
Rogers test, an affirmative statement of sponsorship coupled with
lack of permission from the mark holder would certainly fail this
prong.145 The absence of an affirmative statement, on the other
hand, would not shut down the plaintiff’s claim.146 Furthermore,
courts should interpret what constitutes an affirmative statement
of sponsorship as more than a simple written or oral declaration.
The determination should be made based on the totality of the
See Rosenblatt, supra note 114, at 1057.
See id.
143 A transformed use ensures against risk of actual consumer confusion—
a quintessential determination in the likelihood of confusion test. Polaroid
Corp., 287 F.2d at 493.
144 Currently, courts consider this as the only way of determining whether
a game developer using an unlicensed mark is explicitly misleading to consumers.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Under the new test, this would be
one of multiple considerations.
145 There is no dispute here because this action would almost always indicate
the video game developers’ intent to deceive consumers or at the very least, extreme negligence in doing so.
146 This is consistent with the likelihood of confusion test’s analysis of the
intent of the defendant to capitalize on the reputation of the prior owner. See
Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
141
142

2017]

LET’S STOP PLAYING GAMES

601

circumstances. Courts must look at all of the game developer’s
actions that expose consumers to the unlicensed use.147
As a further factor, courts might also look at the game developer’s purpose for using the mark or likeness in determining if that
use is explicitly misleading. In a way, this speaks somewhat to
artistic relevance, but courts should instead focus on how consumers will interpret the presence of the mark or likeness. Considerations for the factor should include whether the use is necessary
in establishing the context of the video game,148 whether it makes
a symbolic or artistic point,149 or whether it simply seeks to capitalize on the popularity of the trademark or celebrity.150
Finally, courts should look at the frequency with which the
mark or likeness appears in the video game and its importance
taken in the context of the game as a whole.151 Infrequent and
unimportant uses should not trigger the explicitly misleading
prong of the Rogers test. This would still allow for incidental use
of marks in video games.152 Developers could continue to include
well-known trademarks to create an immersive world without
much risk of the average video game player believing that each
small use of a mark represented that mark holder’s involvement
in the creation or promotion of that game.
Utilizing these new factors—transformative use, affirmative
statement of sponsorship, purpose of use, and frequency and importance of use—as part of the Rogers test’s explicitly misleading
prong, courts can look back at the cases discussed above to achieve
more uniformity in the application of a rule. Claims brought under
right of publicity and trademark would all be subject to federal
protection under the Lanham Act, allowing for the application of
the reformed Rogers test in every case. Brown would have been
Under this view, Electronic Arts’s actions regarding Battlefield 4 and
Medal of Honor, as discussed in Part III, would certainly amount to an affirmative statement of sponsorship. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
148 Rosenblatt, supra note 114, at 1057.
149 Id.
150 See Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
151 This speaks to the likelihood of confusion test’s factor of commercial proximity of the products. See supra Part I. A frequently appearing or importantly
placed mark or likeness in a video game runs a greater risk of consumers assuming the two are cross-promoting.
152 See Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1244.
147
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correct in applying Rogers, but the court would have come to the
opposite conclusion.153 While there was no affirmative statement
of sponsorship in that case, Brown’s likeness was not substantially transformed; the purpose of using his image in the game
was to capitalize on his fame and reputation as a football athlete
to attract consumers to purchase the game. His appearance was
also important as a playable character on the 1965 Cleveland
Browns in-game. These factors tend to show that consumers would
be misled by the appearance of Brown’s likeness in the game. The
other football cases involving NCAA players, Keller and Hart,154
would undergo similar analyses under these new Rogers factors
and also come out in favor of the football players, just as they did
under the transformative-use test. Rockstar would also have come
out the same as it did, allowing for the use of the “Pig Pen” virtual
reconstruction of the “Play Pen” strip club.155 However, it would
have been subject to a slightly higher level of scrutiny but ultimately would have been a valid use because the substantial transformation of the parody gentlemen’s club would protect against
consumer confusion.
CONCLUSION
Both the right of publicity and trademark law strive to prevent
consumer confusion by protecting a right holder’s image and reputation against others who seek to take advantage of it. These
rights often come to odds with the First Amendment right of freedom of expression for those who seek to reproduce the holder’s mark
in their work. Video games present a relatively new form of media
in which these rights must be balanced. Their status as both an
artistic medium and a commercial product has confused courts on
which of the two tests—the transformative-use test or the Rogers
test—properly applies to trademark claims under the Lanham
Act and which applies to right of publicity claims. To further obscure the matter, courts have inconsistently applied the two tests,
resulting in varying outcomes for similar claims. Courts could
streamline the matter by devising a single test to apply to both
types of cases. Because video games are significantly commercial
See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239–41 (9th Cir. 2013).
See supra notes 55–65 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text.
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in nature and because consumers have come to expect product
placement and celebrity endorsement in games, plaintiffs can
bring right of publicity claims under the federal protection of the
Lanham Act. This would allow for the application of the Rogers
test in all suits over an unauthorized use of a mark or likeness.
Unfortunately, the Rogers test in its current form is not wellsuited to protect the interests of the mark holder; it is far too lenient to video game developers, allowing for unlicensed mark use.
In order to better balance the rights of mark holders with the artistic expression right of game developers, courts should examine
several factors when determining if an unauthorized use should
be afforded First Amendment protection. These factors will reveal
whether the video game creators are explicitly misleading consumers as to the source of a mark; the factors include: whether
the mark has been substantially transformed, whether the developer has made an affirmative statement of sponsorship regarding
the mark, the purpose of using the mark, and the frequency and
importance of the mark in the context of the video game.

